To begin with, I could not agree more that Driver's account is just plain wrong. No form of ignorance or self-deception can count as a virtue, regardless of the benefit it renders on society. As far as I can see, a virtue is a virtue insofar as it benefits the agent not the society (obviously justice is a problem for this sort of thinking, but this is beside the point [I think at least] for this purpose).
I also agree with your take on the accuracy account. One is not modest just because they correctly gauge their skill. (The global and focused modesty point is very good.)
"She could care about whether her writing really did constitute a genuine accomplishment, which is what the critics views call into question, while not worrying about what anyone thought of her for accomplishing it."I think that this is a very interesting distinction.
What I am curious about however, is this line, "And this will be, on this account, connected to the essence of modesty since someone who is trying to be modest, or to do what a modest person would do, is typically doing so in order to appear modest to someone (even if this is, in the limiting case, only herself). And in that case she does after all care what people think of her." I am not sure that this sounds right to me. How could a person not care what she thought of herself? Good self-esteem seems to be something that is very psychologically valuable and requires a positive self image. I really could not imagine someone who did not care about herself where this not caring is meant to be neutral rather than negative. To me, this sort of consideration brings into question the concept of "false modesty". I do not think that one is falsely modest who first wonders what the modest person would do and then acts accordingly for the same reason that I do not believe that the soldier who wonders what his hero would do and then acts accordingly is not acting courageously. False modesty, if it is anything, is to my mind simple insincerity i.e. when one compares his accomplishments to those of another by saying how much greater than his own those of the other are while saying this in a manner that makes it obvious that he does not think the other's accomplishments are very great. At any rate, I think there is something to talk about here.
Also, I would like to discuss your final paragraph where you say why you think modesty is a virtue. I would like to know more about the thoughts behind that paragraph. Is there a bit of determinism in there? Moreover, I have the intuition that some people are (at the very least) morally better than others and that they deserve praise for being so. It would seem wrong to praise only their acts but not the people. Take another example: the Olympics. Imagine that medals were not given to the athletes but rather to the performances. That would seem ridiculous. Another point, what about willpower? Do you want to say that those who persevere through all sorts of hardships to go on and accomplish something great are not to be praised? To me there seems to be more than just the accomplishment which is valuable but also the process that led to it. One last related point on this issue, imagine a struggling artist who, despite being good, has yet to be recognized. What I imagine this person to want is not just for his paintings to be viewed as good but for him to be viewed as being a good painter. What is important to him is that he has done well. Contrast his situation with one where a man has the ability to snap his fingers and 'poof' create masterpieces ex nihilo. In this case, we would rightly only value the painting not the man (at least for aesthetic reasons, we may value him for magical abilities but that is another story), yet this story seems entirely different than the one with the actual painter. At any rate I would really like to discuss this tomorrow as maybe, I am misconstruing your view and just need a clarification...
Thursday, October 9, 2008
Morals By Agreement: Part I
To begin, Gautier outlines what he plans to show in his work.
According to Gautier, rationality is all about seeking the maximization of benefits for oneself. To be rational is to determine your greatest interest and then to pursue it. Despite the fact that this view would seem to imply that people who act on moral grounds are irrational, Gautier says that this is not so. On his view, acting in accordance with the constraints of morality is rational because when one does so along with his community he will maximize his benefits more than if he along with everyone else failed to act morally. The idea is that completely free agents acting so as to maximize their own benefits will not fare as well as slightly constrained agents acting so as to maximize their own benefits. Morality is to be understood as the constraints.
I want to draw attention to two things Gautier says. "The contractarian need not claim that actual persons take no interest in their fellows: indeed, we suppose that some degree of sociability is characteristic of human beings. But the contractarian sees sociability as enriching human life; for him, it becomes a source of exploitation if it induces persons to acquiesce in institutions and practices that but for their fellow-feelings would be costly to them." I think that the final statement is false. There are certain things that we do for our friends and loved ones that we do not do for just anyone else (raising children, helping elderly parents, doing selfless favors for friends) which would seem to be very costly to us were it not for our "fellow-feelings". Does this in anyway show that these practices are forms of exploitation? Surely this can not be true as it is the "fellow-feeling" that makes us want to do these things. The benefit to us is the well-being of the other person. Another thought that if Gautier takes the sort of approach that he does here with other people's interests, how can he not take the same approach when it comes to a person's own interest? Why not say 'in cases where it would appear costly to partake in a particular practice were it not for his self love, then a person is irrational if he engages in that practice? (Epicetus once wrote (for another purpose) to the effect that it is only because of the fact that we love our bodies so much that we do the things we do as when we imagine having to do these things for others they seem repulsive i.e. washing oneself. The point that you can not separate our affections for something from it when trying to determine whether or not acting in a particular way with regard to it is rational.)
The other statement that I find myself disagreeing with is when he says "Those who claim to establish the rationality of such compliance (with moral principles) appeal to a strong and controversial conception of reason that seems to incorporate prior moral suppositions." The thought that I have here is that it would seem as though those leave out these moral considerations in their conception of reason have the supposition that moral principles are not a part of reason. He says that those who take morality to be a part of reason have just assumed it to be there, but my point is that he has just assumed it not to be there; no argument has been given as to why it is not a part of reason or why it can not be. Maybe an argument will come for this later on, but at this point there is none.
According to Gautier, rationality is all about seeking the maximization of benefits for oneself. To be rational is to determine your greatest interest and then to pursue it. Despite the fact that this view would seem to imply that people who act on moral grounds are irrational, Gautier says that this is not so. On his view, acting in accordance with the constraints of morality is rational because when one does so along with his community he will maximize his benefits more than if he along with everyone else failed to act morally. The idea is that completely free agents acting so as to maximize their own benefits will not fare as well as slightly constrained agents acting so as to maximize their own benefits. Morality is to be understood as the constraints.
I want to draw attention to two things Gautier says. "The contractarian need not claim that actual persons take no interest in their fellows: indeed, we suppose that some degree of sociability is characteristic of human beings. But the contractarian sees sociability as enriching human life; for him, it becomes a source of exploitation if it induces persons to acquiesce in institutions and practices that but for their fellow-feelings would be costly to them." I think that the final statement is false. There are certain things that we do for our friends and loved ones that we do not do for just anyone else (raising children, helping elderly parents, doing selfless favors for friends) which would seem to be very costly to us were it not for our "fellow-feelings". Does this in anyway show that these practices are forms of exploitation? Surely this can not be true as it is the "fellow-feeling" that makes us want to do these things. The benefit to us is the well-being of the other person. Another thought that if Gautier takes the sort of approach that he does here with other people's interests, how can he not take the same approach when it comes to a person's own interest? Why not say 'in cases where it would appear costly to partake in a particular practice were it not for his self love, then a person is irrational if he engages in that practice? (Epicetus once wrote (for another purpose) to the effect that it is only because of the fact that we love our bodies so much that we do the things we do as when we imagine having to do these things for others they seem repulsive i.e. washing oneself. The point that you can not separate our affections for something from it when trying to determine whether or not acting in a particular way with regard to it is rational.)
The other statement that I find myself disagreeing with is when he says "Those who claim to establish the rationality of such compliance (with moral principles) appeal to a strong and controversial conception of reason that seems to incorporate prior moral suppositions." The thought that I have here is that it would seem as though those leave out these moral considerations in their conception of reason have the supposition that moral principles are not a part of reason. He says that those who take morality to be a part of reason have just assumed it to be there, but my point is that he has just assumed it not to be there; no argument has been given as to why it is not a part of reason or why it can not be. Maybe an argument will come for this later on, but at this point there is none.
Monday, October 6, 2008
Thomas: Chapter 7 and 8
In these chapters Thomas's goal is to argue that those who have a morally good character are more likely to live well (i.e. living a good life, reaching contentment, flourish, be happy). He does not want to say, like Plato, that every person with a morally good character is happier in virtue of having a morally good character than a person who is without it.
For Thomas, flourishing requires (among other things) a proper regard for oneself which is to be concerned with oneself and one's interactions with others, friends and loved one's in particular. Proper regard for oneself amounts to self-love which is the belief that one ought to be treated morally and the desire to flourish (there is nothing necessarily egoistic about this as one can still at times prefer the interests of others over his own). In terms of one's friends and loved ones, it is clear that a person could not be happy without these social relationships and that one can not truly be said to be a friend of another if he does not (or is not willing to) contribute substantially to the well-being and interests of the other person. Moreover, with regard to strangers and people who one does not know well, he should realize that if he desires to be treated morally (and that moral treatment is required for flourishing in that one who is unjustly hindered at all times could never flourish) then other people will desire the same and have the same right to be so treated as he has.
Thomas also makes the claim that psychic harmony is very important to one's well being and that the person with a morally good character is more likely to achieve psychic harmony. Psychic harmony is to be understood as our knowledge of our reasons for acting. As it is the case the person of moral character will not have to feign his true feelings, the reasons that he gives for doing things are the reasons that he actually has. The same is not so for the immoral person. He must give very different reasons for acting than the one's he actually has for otherwise he would be suspected and hindered by other people. (Roughly, the idea is that it is extremely psychologically taxing to keep all your lies straight and so on.) Moreover, Thomas wants to say that the immoral person is essentially insincere. A promise from him does not mean the same thing as it does from a moral person and even to those who he truly loves and cares about his word can never be as solid as the truly honest man. The immoral person in virtue of being immoral lives a life of insincerity and, what is more, it may well turn out that after a time he himself has trouble distinguishing between sincere and insincere feelings, motives, etc. It is in this sense that Thomas means that he is lacking in self-knowledge (i.e. knowledge of his motivations) whereas the moral person is not lacking this knowledge. [argument for this p. 216-232] Furthermore, [p.229-230 "John and Peter"] even when the immoral person is dealing with those whom he loves and cares about his reasons for acting in the way he does toward them could be, as a result of his typical immoral way of dealing with and reasoning about his interactions with people, not out of actual care for them but out of his self-interested desire to maintain them as friends. And this it would seem would be quite distressing to the genuinely immoral person because he truly does care about his people and wants that to be his reason for acting as he does. This sort of thing can not happen to the moral person as he is not a master of insincerity and thus is not as readily able to act in this way. [I did not give this argument much credit the first time I looked at it, but at a second glance I like it a lot more.]
For Thomas, flourishing requires (among other things) a proper regard for oneself which is to be concerned with oneself and one's interactions with others, friends and loved one's in particular. Proper regard for oneself amounts to self-love which is the belief that one ought to be treated morally and the desire to flourish (there is nothing necessarily egoistic about this as one can still at times prefer the interests of others over his own). In terms of one's friends and loved ones, it is clear that a person could not be happy without these social relationships and that one can not truly be said to be a friend of another if he does not (or is not willing to) contribute substantially to the well-being and interests of the other person. Moreover, with regard to strangers and people who one does not know well, he should realize that if he desires to be treated morally (and that moral treatment is required for flourishing in that one who is unjustly hindered at all times could never flourish) then other people will desire the same and have the same right to be so treated as he has.
Thomas also makes the claim that psychic harmony is very important to one's well being and that the person with a morally good character is more likely to achieve psychic harmony. Psychic harmony is to be understood as our knowledge of our reasons for acting. As it is the case the person of moral character will not have to feign his true feelings, the reasons that he gives for doing things are the reasons that he actually has. The same is not so for the immoral person. He must give very different reasons for acting than the one's he actually has for otherwise he would be suspected and hindered by other people. (Roughly, the idea is that it is extremely psychologically taxing to keep all your lies straight and so on.) Moreover, Thomas wants to say that the immoral person is essentially insincere. A promise from him does not mean the same thing as it does from a moral person and even to those who he truly loves and cares about his word can never be as solid as the truly honest man. The immoral person in virtue of being immoral lives a life of insincerity and, what is more, it may well turn out that after a time he himself has trouble distinguishing between sincere and insincere feelings, motives, etc. It is in this sense that Thomas means that he is lacking in self-knowledge (i.e. knowledge of his motivations) whereas the moral person is not lacking this knowledge. [argument for this p. 216-232] Furthermore, [p.229-230 "John and Peter"] even when the immoral person is dealing with those whom he loves and cares about his reasons for acting in the way he does toward them could be, as a result of his typical immoral way of dealing with and reasoning about his interactions with people, not out of actual care for them but out of his self-interested desire to maintain them as friends. And this it would seem would be quite distressing to the genuinely immoral person because he truly does care about his people and wants that to be his reason for acting as he does. This sort of thing can not happen to the moral person as he is not a master of insincerity and thus is not as readily able to act in this way. [I did not give this argument much credit the first time I looked at it, but at a second glance I like it a lot more.]
Friday, October 3, 2008
Thomas: Chapter 6
This chapter deals with how morality/altruism between strangers works and though it does not give much in the way of argument as to why it does and should work, I think that Thomas has some very interesting insights throughout.
To begin, Thomas starts out with the uncontroversial claim that a person who is treated well by another person will tend to like that person more. In other words those who are consistently nice to us gain our affections. (This is the same reasoning that was behind why children love their parents.) This is important because not only does it make us favorably disposed toward those people who are nice to us it also gives us certain counterfactual beliefs about these people. For example, if Smith always helps me out whenever I am indeed then I will likely form the belief that if I end up being in need Smith will help me out. The idea here is quite simple and it is that as I become more favorably disposed to those who are kind to me I will also become more likely to do kind things for them, which will in turn increase their feelings towards me and so on.
What is more is that we all (at least in most societies, though not all) have a basic level of trust for one another. Even though we tend not to think about it, no one runs around believing that the strangers he passes on the street desire to kill him. If we thought for a moment that people desired to kill us or do us harm it would be psychologically impossible for us to live decent lives. We would always be terrified that someone would try to do us in. This is still the case even if we imagine that murders were always caught by the authorities and harshly punished. It is the thought that people desire to harm us and would if they could only get away with it that would make this state of affairs psychologically unbearable. The sort of life that we lead depends in large part on our tendency to at least on a very basic level trust one another. A further example. It is quite common for one person to ask a complete stranger what time it is or when the next bus will arrive. Yet when we ask such things there is not even the slightest suspicion that the person might lie to us (at least in ordinary circumstances). Even if it turns out that the wrong information was given our tendency is to think that the person was ignorant of the facts or just foolish and not that he was being malicious. Again this displays that basic level of trust that we have for one another and also the fact that in general people do not desire to harm one another (so long as their interests are not at state, then we have a different story).
Now Thomas points out that this level of trust need not exist, as it likely does not in some countries that have experienced extreme hardships (i.e. famine, disease, civil war, etc.). Moreover, just as kind actions from another tend to improve our opinion of them, mean acts from another tend to diminish our opinion of them. Thus, the circumstances play a very important role whether these morality-friendly conditions exist. (This idea reminds me of Aristotle's points about certain conditions need to be met in a persons environment before it is even possible for that person to attempt to achieve eudaimonia.)
Despite the fact that it need not be the case that we live is a society where these conditions are met, it seems to be the case that (at least most of the time) these conditions are met in our society. Thus, if we get a good start in life and are shown kindness by those around us it becomes more and more likely that we will acquire beliefs about the people around us that they will try to help us if we are in need. This then, coupled with the fact that people in general to not desire to harm other people, can form the basis for our basic level of trust of those around us who we may not know well as well as strangers. Again, this is not meant to give us any answer to Gyges type problems but is rather meant to be seen as an explanation of why things are the way they are morally speaking. Thomas wants to say why people have moral sentiments and desires not why they should.
To begin, Thomas starts out with the uncontroversial claim that a person who is treated well by another person will tend to like that person more. In other words those who are consistently nice to us gain our affections. (This is the same reasoning that was behind why children love their parents.) This is important because not only does it make us favorably disposed toward those people who are nice to us it also gives us certain counterfactual beliefs about these people. For example, if Smith always helps me out whenever I am indeed then I will likely form the belief that if I end up being in need Smith will help me out. The idea here is quite simple and it is that as I become more favorably disposed to those who are kind to me I will also become more likely to do kind things for them, which will in turn increase their feelings towards me and so on.
What is more is that we all (at least in most societies, though not all) have a basic level of trust for one another. Even though we tend not to think about it, no one runs around believing that the strangers he passes on the street desire to kill him. If we thought for a moment that people desired to kill us or do us harm it would be psychologically impossible for us to live decent lives. We would always be terrified that someone would try to do us in. This is still the case even if we imagine that murders were always caught by the authorities and harshly punished. It is the thought that people desire to harm us and would if they could only get away with it that would make this state of affairs psychologically unbearable. The sort of life that we lead depends in large part on our tendency to at least on a very basic level trust one another. A further example. It is quite common for one person to ask a complete stranger what time it is or when the next bus will arrive. Yet when we ask such things there is not even the slightest suspicion that the person might lie to us (at least in ordinary circumstances). Even if it turns out that the wrong information was given our tendency is to think that the person was ignorant of the facts or just foolish and not that he was being malicious. Again this displays that basic level of trust that we have for one another and also the fact that in general people do not desire to harm one another (so long as their interests are not at state, then we have a different story).
Now Thomas points out that this level of trust need not exist, as it likely does not in some countries that have experienced extreme hardships (i.e. famine, disease, civil war, etc.). Moreover, just as kind actions from another tend to improve our opinion of them, mean acts from another tend to diminish our opinion of them. Thus, the circumstances play a very important role whether these morality-friendly conditions exist. (This idea reminds me of Aristotle's points about certain conditions need to be met in a persons environment before it is even possible for that person to attempt to achieve eudaimonia.)
Despite the fact that it need not be the case that we live is a society where these conditions are met, it seems to be the case that (at least most of the time) these conditions are met in our society. Thus, if we get a good start in life and are shown kindness by those around us it becomes more and more likely that we will acquire beliefs about the people around us that they will try to help us if we are in need. This then, coupled with the fact that people in general to not desire to harm other people, can form the basis for our basic level of trust of those around us who we may not know well as well as strangers. Again, this is not meant to give us any answer to Gyges type problems but is rather meant to be seen as an explanation of why things are the way they are morally speaking. Thomas wants to say why people have moral sentiments and desires not why they should.
Thomas: Chapter 4 and 5
Chapters 4 and 5 deal with friendship and its importance for morality. Thomas echoes Aristotle's sentiments in saying that a person's life would not be worth living, even if he had every other good in the world, were he to be without friendship. Friendship is an extremely important of a person's life and contributes substantially to that person's flourishing. Thomas discusses in depth his conception of friendship but that is not directly relevant to our purposes so I will leave it out. The important point from these chapters is that friendship requires altruism which is to say that it requires friends to act in such ways so as to respect, advance and protect one another's well being. A true friend is happy to see his friend succeed or flourish and is sad to seem him fail. The flourishing of one requires the flourishing of the other. Given the good that friendship is for people and the importance we attach to it there can be no doubt that we develop the ability to perceive the interests of our friends as well as the motivation to help them. Thomas says that these are essentially moral sensibilities as we learn how to determine and care about advancing the interests of others.
This is important to morality as a whole because our friends are not a separate species from other people and thus the moral sensibilities we develop in dealing with friends can also be applied to other people. For example, we can clearly see how an action may help or hinder the interests of another person even if we are not friends with that person. In other words friendship gives us the tools for social interaction at large.
However, I have to add some commentary here. Everything that Thomas said here is compatible with the gangster egoist we have imagined before. One can truly see and care about the well-being of some people without caring at all for the well-being of others though he may know full well what it would be to hurt or help it. What Thomas is trying to do is lay the foundation for moral sentiments/feelings. He wants to show that people are not inherently only self-interested and he wants to show where altruistic feelings come from. In this regard I think he has done quite well, but what none of this does is show that these feelings are applied to complete strangers or anybody out of one's circle. Certainly these feelings can be applied to others but showing that they arise in certain contexts does not show in anyway that they are spread over all contexts. Thomas needs something more in order to get around the problem of the the gangster who does everything he can for the well-being of his family and friends but sees everyone else as expendable when it comes to accomplishing his goals.
This is important to morality as a whole because our friends are not a separate species from other people and thus the moral sensibilities we develop in dealing with friends can also be applied to other people. For example, we can clearly see how an action may help or hinder the interests of another person even if we are not friends with that person. In other words friendship gives us the tools for social interaction at large.
However, I have to add some commentary here. Everything that Thomas said here is compatible with the gangster egoist we have imagined before. One can truly see and care about the well-being of some people without caring at all for the well-being of others though he may know full well what it would be to hurt or help it. What Thomas is trying to do is lay the foundation for moral sentiments/feelings. He wants to show that people are not inherently only self-interested and he wants to show where altruistic feelings come from. In this regard I think he has done quite well, but what none of this does is show that these feelings are applied to complete strangers or anybody out of one's circle. Certainly these feelings can be applied to others but showing that they arise in certain contexts does not show in anyway that they are spread over all contexts. Thomas needs something more in order to get around the problem of the the gangster who does everything he can for the well-being of his family and friends but sees everyone else as expendable when it comes to accomplishing his goals.
Thomas: Chapter 3
In this next chapter Thomas builds off what he established in the previous one. Though it has been argued that biology provides us with the capacity for morality/altruism it does not guarantee it. Like other abilities it needs to be developed from a young age in order to produce a person with a good moral character. Thomas believes that in order to account for this fact one must again look at parental love and see how it can affect the child.
The essence of his argument is that parental love is a clear instance of altruism. Parents sacrifice many opportunities for personal benefit in favor of benefiting their children. This is especially important for a child as it is, in its early stages, completely vulnerable and unable to take care of itself. Moreover, realizing these facts causes the child to reciprocate the love of its parents. It is from this that from an early age children learn what it is to act altruistically towards another person which in turn helps to develop their altruistic capacity. (Of course, not all parents treat their children well and thus this explanation leaves out those children whose parents were not so good. However, Thomas's point requires only that this sort of parental love and reciprocation does happen some times.)
Moreover, children have a great tendency to emulate their parents. This is important because upon realizing the connection between their parents's love for them and their altruistic acts the child tends to act in kind. And this is true as, even though children can obviously not match their parents in terms of benefiting each other, children often do (or try to do at least) nice things for their parents. The point here is that at an early age children (can) learn what it is like to be loved and have other people act altruistically towards them. Furthermore, this serves as the basis of the child's reciprocation and thus their motivation to act for the well-being of another.
Another important point about parental love that Thomas mentions is its importance in a child's development of moral autonomy self-esteem. Parents, through their unconditional love, show their children that they are valued not for anything they do but just for who they are. A parent may approve or disapprove of a child's aciton and thereby teach the child what is appropriate and what is not, but despite this does not accompany disapproval with rejection. The child is always accepted and loved. This is very important for the psychological security of the child as it knows that whatever it does it will still be valued and cared for. Also, this helps the child build up a conception of its self worth and is thus less affected by attacks on that worth by others. Through their love and support, Thomas argues that parents bolster their children's self-esteem/sense of self worth against failures and the criticisms of others. Moral autonomy is also in part developed here as the child is not required to adhere unquestioningly to some authority in order to gain acceptance.
The essence of his argument is that parental love is a clear instance of altruism. Parents sacrifice many opportunities for personal benefit in favor of benefiting their children. This is especially important for a child as it is, in its early stages, completely vulnerable and unable to take care of itself. Moreover, realizing these facts causes the child to reciprocate the love of its parents. It is from this that from an early age children learn what it is to act altruistically towards another person which in turn helps to develop their altruistic capacity. (Of course, not all parents treat their children well and thus this explanation leaves out those children whose parents were not so good. However, Thomas's point requires only that this sort of parental love and reciprocation does happen some times.)
Moreover, children have a great tendency to emulate their parents. This is important because upon realizing the connection between their parents's love for them and their altruistic acts the child tends to act in kind. And this is true as, even though children can obviously not match their parents in terms of benefiting each other, children often do (or try to do at least) nice things for their parents. The point here is that at an early age children (can) learn what it is like to be loved and have other people act altruistically towards them. Furthermore, this serves as the basis of the child's reciprocation and thus their motivation to act for the well-being of another.
Another important point about parental love that Thomas mentions is its importance in a child's development of moral autonomy self-esteem. Parents, through their unconditional love, show their children that they are valued not for anything they do but just for who they are. A parent may approve or disapprove of a child's aciton and thereby teach the child what is appropriate and what is not, but despite this does not accompany disapproval with rejection. The child is always accepted and loved. This is very important for the psychological security of the child as it knows that whatever it does it will still be valued and cared for. Also, this helps the child build up a conception of its self worth and is thus less affected by attacks on that worth by others. Through their love and support, Thomas argues that parents bolster their children's self-esteem/sense of self worth against failures and the criticisms of others. Moral autonomy is also in part developed here as the child is not required to adhere unquestioningly to some authority in order to gain acceptance.
Thursday, October 2, 2008
Thomas: Chapter 2
In this chapter, Thomas attempts to build the foundations of altruism in biology. The essence of his argument is that love is a form of altruism and that given the sort of species that we are love is essential to our survival. An infant would never grow to maturity were it not for parental love. He quickly dispatches the thought that any altruism based in biology is really masked self-interest by saying 1) that a person acting altruistically toward his child does not first think "does this act help preserve/strengthen the future of my genetic material" but rather only thinks "does this act help my child" and 2) it makes no sense to say that altruistic acts towards non-family members are in any way meant to or in anyway do ensure the future of ones genes. Furthermore, he claims that there is a clear difference between what we desire to do and what biology disposes us to do (I found this to be very interesting). Biology may dispose us to have altruistic feelings towards an infant that is crying but that does not say what we desire to do. We may desire to act on those feelings or not to. Moreover, supposing that we do desire to help the child we may be glad that we have the disposition to feel as we do towards it. (Another example, a smoker may desire to quit and as a result lament urges to smoke whereas a sky diver may desire to jump out of planes with a parachute and as a result be glad that he has the urge to thrill seek.) The point is that it is our desires that matter when it comes to moral motivation and that our biological constitution does not determine our desires as they can be in line with it or against it. Thomas also makes the point that there is a difference between doing something that benefits you and doing something that benefits you because it benefits you. This means that altruistic acts may benefit the actor in some way or another but this does not mean the acts were not altruistic. Thus claiming that there is a biological basis of altruism is not a self-defeating claim.
Thomas then goes on to talk about the importance of parental love in morality. This is a case where people (parents) make enormous sacrifices for the well-being of other people (their children). What is especially important here is that parents love their children with no strings attached so to speak. They care only for the well-being of the child and this is not tied to any particular trait the child has. It is this unconditional love, Thomas argues, that provides a child with psychological security; it knows that it will always be accepted and loved by those on whom it depends entirely. This accounts for the child's reciprocation of that love. What is also important here is that this love and concern for another's well being can not be explained away as self-interested from a biological point of view because it also exists between parents who have adopted and their adopted child. The point that Thomas is trying to make is that our biology has endowed us with altruistic sentiments/feelings (i.e. parental love) and that, as these sentiments are essentially moral sentiments, biology can clearly be seen to be a part of the basis of morality and not just the basis for our self-interestedness (i.e. survival instinct).
Thomas goes on to say that once these moral sentiments are established, we can at least see that people are not inherently only self-interested beings. Given this, we can see the beginnings of how altruistic sentiments can spread to include other people as well. What is important to note here, however, is that thus far Thomas has not claimed to find the basis of morality or ground it in any substantial way. All he has tried to show at this point is that moral/altruistic sentiments are not contrary to our biological make up or intrinsic nature; biology does not show that we are just self-interested. It is this fact that Thomas takes to be part of the basis for morality as it shows that human beings have the capacity for moral/altruisitc sentiments and therefore motivations.
Thomas then goes on to talk about the importance of parental love in morality. This is a case where people (parents) make enormous sacrifices for the well-being of other people (their children). What is especially important here is that parents love their children with no strings attached so to speak. They care only for the well-being of the child and this is not tied to any particular trait the child has. It is this unconditional love, Thomas argues, that provides a child with psychological security; it knows that it will always be accepted and loved by those on whom it depends entirely. This accounts for the child's reciprocation of that love. What is also important here is that this love and concern for another's well being can not be explained away as self-interested from a biological point of view because it also exists between parents who have adopted and their adopted child. The point that Thomas is trying to make is that our biology has endowed us with altruistic sentiments/feelings (i.e. parental love) and that, as these sentiments are essentially moral sentiments, biology can clearly be seen to be a part of the basis of morality and not just the basis for our self-interestedness (i.e. survival instinct).
Thomas goes on to say that once these moral sentiments are established, we can at least see that people are not inherently only self-interested beings. Given this, we can see the beginnings of how altruistic sentiments can spread to include other people as well. What is important to note here, however, is that thus far Thomas has not claimed to find the basis of morality or ground it in any substantial way. All he has tried to show at this point is that moral/altruistic sentiments are not contrary to our biological make up or intrinsic nature; biology does not show that we are just self-interested. It is this fact that Thomas takes to be part of the basis for morality as it shows that human beings have the capacity for moral/altruisitc sentiments and therefore motivations.
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