Time and Life's Meaning
As it is very important for virtue ethics that human beings have some sort of purpose, I thought that this article might therefore help in getting a conception of what that purpose might be. Moreover, because Richard Taylor is a virtue ethicist, it would seem that his account of human purpose would be very relevant in my study.
In the article, Taylor considers what makes things meaningful or important in some way. First he imagines what our universe would be like if there were no life so as to examine whether or not it would be meaningful. Though there would be novelties in such a world (i.e. snowflake patterns that have never before existed) there would be no meaning because every event that occurred would be somehow implicit in the events and conditions that came before it. Every future occurance could be predicted beforehand and, in a sense, nothing would ever change. There would be no unique occurances, so to speak.
Taylor then considers this world with the addition of animals save human beings. This world would also lack meaning for similar reasons. Again, there would be the novelty similar to that of a snowflake, but nothing of an interesting sort. Each animal would live out its life cycle with invariance resulting in no difference between, say, a squirrel from a 100 years ago and one from the present. Again, what would be lacking something that is unique. Taylor compares this world to an endless play where all the acts are identical. All that ever changes is the actual actors, yet the plot, costumes, lines, etc. are always the same. This would thus lack in meaning or significance because it would not matter which act and audience saw performed.
Finally, human beings, rational animals, enter the picture. Yet, simply adding people to the mix does not create meaning. Taylor considers the myth of Sisyphus in order to show this. Sisyphus is an example of a human being whose life is not meaningful because he does the same repetitive task all day everyday (pushing a boulder up a hill where, once on top, it rolls down and he must perform the task again). The meaninglessness would not change if he had a smaller boulder or if he liked rolling boulders as it remains pointless repetition. Taylor considers other modifications so as to show what it would take to make Sisyphus's life meaningful until he imagines that, rather than the same rock over and over, Sisyphus pushes a new rock up the hill each time and that then these rocks are put together one by one to build a beautiful temple. Yet, this is still not enough for Taylor as such a story is consistent with Sisyphus being a slave who is compelled to move these rocks. Though he may know what is going on, what he is doing and think that the temple is beautiful, his life is still not meaningful as he has no control over what he is doing. The modification that is needed in order to make such a life meaningful would be for Sisyphus to push the rocks to the top of the hill for the very purpose of creating this temple which is the product of his own creative intelligence. It is something that would not have existed but for his imagination and efforts and it is finally then that his life, or at least his current pursuit has meaning. In essence, it is creating which give meaning.
All in all, I am not so sure what I think about Taylor's ideas here. They are certainly interesting and it does seem intuitive (to me at least) to think that Sisyphus's pursuit is not meaningful or significant until it becomes something that he is doing for his own purposes as a result of his own projects. Nevertheless, I am unsure as to what the standard is here, in that is is Sisyphus or someone(thing) else that determines when his activities become meaningful. If it is him, then the whole things seems arbitrary, yet if it is something external, then what (or who) is it? Taylor does not say much here and I do not really no what to think about it, though I certainly do agree with him that there is a great difference between a world lacking entirely in any human creations (in the sense here discussed) and the same world with simply one addition, say, the Sistine Chapel. There seems to be a supreme difference in these two worlds, so I am sympathetic to Taylor's views but do not know how to justify them.
Here is a quick thought: I have been thinking about what sort of external standard Taylor could appeal to so as to justify this ideas on what makes life meaningful. Certainly an external standard seems necessary in order to prevent arbitrariness, but it also seems hard to find. However, could it be the case that the proper standard for this sort thing would be the human standard or just that which humanity sees as meaningful. So I guess my thought is that the talk about meaning and significance is to be understood in terms of meaningful, not the universe or something of that nature, but to humanity as a whole. Or, maybe, in other words, it is those pursuits and activities whose products yield the goods that make life worth living which are endowed with meaning. Just a thought...
Ancient Wisdom and Modern Folly
I thought that this essay would be worthwhile because it deals with the ancient and modern understandings of the terms "good", "happiness" and "justice" as well as touching upon the uses of such words as "right", "wrong" and "obligatory" in modern ethical theory.
It would not be odd in contemporary society to say of a poor, humble, insignificant man that, despite these features, he is a good man. For the ancients however, this would be entirely ridiculous. The notion of a good man for the thinkers of so many years past was tied to the notion of a superior man; a person who was literally better than average people. A good man is better than other men as a result of his possession of the virtues meaning it is through the possession and exercise of these that makes him superior. Being virtuous, on the ancient conception, is the same as being good, which is the same as being superior. This is not even all that odd when you think about it. A good hammer is superior to an average hammer simply because its possesses virtues that make it better at hammering nails than the average hammer. The ancients, Taylor says, thought that the opposite of a good man was a common or insignificant one which is quite different from the more modern conception whose opposite would be mean or vicious.
With regard to happiness, Taylor also thinks that the meanings of the ancients and the moderns is quite different. Nowadays we tend to describe happiness as a feeling somewhat on a par with well-being and enjoyment. Essentially, it is a subjective emotion more or less. Contrariwise, the ancients believed it to be more of a state that one inhabited given the satisfaction of certain conditions (i.e. being virtuous, having certain externals, etc.) and thus did not see happiness and something subjective at all. In the minds of the ancients, one could objectively determine whether or not one had obtained this rare and greatly valued state simply by looking at the sort of life they had led (or are leading). Happiness, on this view, in terms of the type of thing it is, is on a par with being healthy rather than with feeling depressed. The important difference here is that in wondering whether or not someone is healthy it is the testimony of the doctor that holds more weight than the person in question, whereas in the case of depression it is the testimony of the person in question which takes precedence. As a result, the final judge in determining whether or not a man is happy is not necessarily that man. With a conception of happiness like this, utilitarianism and its happiness maximization schemes are just nonsense.
Taylor also describes the ancient Greek conception of "justice" which he says two understandings. What Plato had in mind in his Republic was justice as a virtue whose expression was the harmonious condition of the soul. The other understanding, which can be found in Aristotle and others, is justice as custom regulating the buying and selling of goods, making contracts, etc. In other words, a just man would one who adhered to the laws and customs of his homeland. The idea that justice was something that had its origin outside of humanity, was universally binding and fixed was quite foreign to these thinkers despite the fact that this is just what our modern conception is like. On a conception such as this, which Taylor seems to favor, it makes no sense to speak of an unjust law because the just simply is the laws and practices of the state whose law is being discussed. Essentially, it makes justice relative to the society being discussed and thus can not be used to criticize another society (one can't say that this or that society is unjust). What one can say, however, is how well or poorly the laws, customs and practices of another society contribute to the prosperity of its citizens. This reminds me very much of Williams where in one of his final chapters he says that it would be possible to determine which ethical system is better for mankind. His idea made no sense to me at the time but in light of what Taylor is saying I think that I can make more sense of it. Moreover, thinking of justice has an important benefit: one can verify the claim that a certain set of laws is better than another for producing happy (and I mean happy in the ancient sense), thriving citizens whereas one could not verify a claim that a certain set of laws are unjust (there is nothing you could point to, other than your theory, that would confirm it). I found this very interesting.
Finally, Taylor talks about modern notions of "right", "wrong" and "obligatory". He says that such words only have a sense when set in relation to rules, laws, etc. As a result, these concepts can only be applied to actions that fall within the jurisdiction of the relevant set of laws. For the so called moral rights and wrongs, then, there must be some universal moral law which determines them. Yet showing there to be such things is exceedingly difficult and would require either a divine lawgiver, some sort of Kantian metaphysics, or etc. Whichever one of these one selects, these theories are problem laden (and I think they fail). If it is true that there are no such laws, then it is also true that there can be no moral rights and wrongs and obligations, yet this does not mean the end for ethics as these were not the things that ancient moralists were concerned with. What remains is ethics that deals with virtue and happiness and such an ethics may be very successful.
I found Taylor's analysis very interesting and good. I agree with his discussion of the ancient meanings of "good", "happiness" and "justice" and think that it is necessary to have these conceptions in mind when considering virtue ethics. Moreover, it really shows how radically different virtue ethics is as a theory when compared to the other major theories. At any rate, his discussion of moral rights and wrongs was also very interesting. I think that it is more or less correct. What he did say that I was a little unsure of was that without laws pertaining to these actions there is no murder just killing, there is no theft just taking and there is no owning just occupying. The third one seems right to me, but the first two I am unsure of. Maybe this is because I am just so acculturated with notions of moral right and wrong... What I thought was interesting though was that his view on these terms seems to imply that without the law the Williamesque "thick" concepts are eliminated. Murder is a thick concept whereas killing is not, which I thought was interesting. So far I must say that I like Taylor. I do not know if he is right, but he offers a very different way of looking at things which I think is, at the very least, worth considering.
Anyway, that is all for now. More to come shortly.
As it is very important for virtue ethics that human beings have some sort of purpose, I thought that this article might therefore help in getting a conception of what that purpose might be. Moreover, because Richard Taylor is a virtue ethicist, it would seem that his account of human purpose would be very relevant in my study.
In the article, Taylor considers what makes things meaningful or important in some way. First he imagines what our universe would be like if there were no life so as to examine whether or not it would be meaningful. Though there would be novelties in such a world (i.e. snowflake patterns that have never before existed) there would be no meaning because every event that occurred would be somehow implicit in the events and conditions that came before it. Every future occurance could be predicted beforehand and, in a sense, nothing would ever change. There would be no unique occurances, so to speak.
Taylor then considers this world with the addition of animals save human beings. This world would also lack meaning for similar reasons. Again, there would be the novelty similar to that of a snowflake, but nothing of an interesting sort. Each animal would live out its life cycle with invariance resulting in no difference between, say, a squirrel from a 100 years ago and one from the present. Again, what would be lacking something that is unique. Taylor compares this world to an endless play where all the acts are identical. All that ever changes is the actual actors, yet the plot, costumes, lines, etc. are always the same. This would thus lack in meaning or significance because it would not matter which act and audience saw performed.
Finally, human beings, rational animals, enter the picture. Yet, simply adding people to the mix does not create meaning. Taylor considers the myth of Sisyphus in order to show this. Sisyphus is an example of a human being whose life is not meaningful because he does the same repetitive task all day everyday (pushing a boulder up a hill where, once on top, it rolls down and he must perform the task again). The meaninglessness would not change if he had a smaller boulder or if he liked rolling boulders as it remains pointless repetition. Taylor considers other modifications so as to show what it would take to make Sisyphus's life meaningful until he imagines that, rather than the same rock over and over, Sisyphus pushes a new rock up the hill each time and that then these rocks are put together one by one to build a beautiful temple. Yet, this is still not enough for Taylor as such a story is consistent with Sisyphus being a slave who is compelled to move these rocks. Though he may know what is going on, what he is doing and think that the temple is beautiful, his life is still not meaningful as he has no control over what he is doing. The modification that is needed in order to make such a life meaningful would be for Sisyphus to push the rocks to the top of the hill for the very purpose of creating this temple which is the product of his own creative intelligence. It is something that would not have existed but for his imagination and efforts and it is finally then that his life, or at least his current pursuit has meaning. In essence, it is creating which give meaning.
All in all, I am not so sure what I think about Taylor's ideas here. They are certainly interesting and it does seem intuitive (to me at least) to think that Sisyphus's pursuit is not meaningful or significant until it becomes something that he is doing for his own purposes as a result of his own projects. Nevertheless, I am unsure as to what the standard is here, in that is is Sisyphus or someone(thing) else that determines when his activities become meaningful. If it is him, then the whole things seems arbitrary, yet if it is something external, then what (or who) is it? Taylor does not say much here and I do not really no what to think about it, though I certainly do agree with him that there is a great difference between a world lacking entirely in any human creations (in the sense here discussed) and the same world with simply one addition, say, the Sistine Chapel. There seems to be a supreme difference in these two worlds, so I am sympathetic to Taylor's views but do not know how to justify them.
Here is a quick thought: I have been thinking about what sort of external standard Taylor could appeal to so as to justify this ideas on what makes life meaningful. Certainly an external standard seems necessary in order to prevent arbitrariness, but it also seems hard to find. However, could it be the case that the proper standard for this sort thing would be the human standard or just that which humanity sees as meaningful. So I guess my thought is that the talk about meaning and significance is to be understood in terms of meaningful, not the universe or something of that nature, but to humanity as a whole. Or, maybe, in other words, it is those pursuits and activities whose products yield the goods that make life worth living which are endowed with meaning. Just a thought...
Ancient Wisdom and Modern Folly
I thought that this essay would be worthwhile because it deals with the ancient and modern understandings of the terms "good", "happiness" and "justice" as well as touching upon the uses of such words as "right", "wrong" and "obligatory" in modern ethical theory.
It would not be odd in contemporary society to say of a poor, humble, insignificant man that, despite these features, he is a good man. For the ancients however, this would be entirely ridiculous. The notion of a good man for the thinkers of so many years past was tied to the notion of a superior man; a person who was literally better than average people. A good man is better than other men as a result of his possession of the virtues meaning it is through the possession and exercise of these that makes him superior. Being virtuous, on the ancient conception, is the same as being good, which is the same as being superior. This is not even all that odd when you think about it. A good hammer is superior to an average hammer simply because its possesses virtues that make it better at hammering nails than the average hammer. The ancients, Taylor says, thought that the opposite of a good man was a common or insignificant one which is quite different from the more modern conception whose opposite would be mean or vicious.
With regard to happiness, Taylor also thinks that the meanings of the ancients and the moderns is quite different. Nowadays we tend to describe happiness as a feeling somewhat on a par with well-being and enjoyment. Essentially, it is a subjective emotion more or less. Contrariwise, the ancients believed it to be more of a state that one inhabited given the satisfaction of certain conditions (i.e. being virtuous, having certain externals, etc.) and thus did not see happiness and something subjective at all. In the minds of the ancients, one could objectively determine whether or not one had obtained this rare and greatly valued state simply by looking at the sort of life they had led (or are leading). Happiness, on this view, in terms of the type of thing it is, is on a par with being healthy rather than with feeling depressed. The important difference here is that in wondering whether or not someone is healthy it is the testimony of the doctor that holds more weight than the person in question, whereas in the case of depression it is the testimony of the person in question which takes precedence. As a result, the final judge in determining whether or not a man is happy is not necessarily that man. With a conception of happiness like this, utilitarianism and its happiness maximization schemes are just nonsense.
Taylor also describes the ancient Greek conception of "justice" which he says two understandings. What Plato had in mind in his Republic was justice as a virtue whose expression was the harmonious condition of the soul. The other understanding, which can be found in Aristotle and others, is justice as custom regulating the buying and selling of goods, making contracts, etc. In other words, a just man would one who adhered to the laws and customs of his homeland. The idea that justice was something that had its origin outside of humanity, was universally binding and fixed was quite foreign to these thinkers despite the fact that this is just what our modern conception is like. On a conception such as this, which Taylor seems to favor, it makes no sense to speak of an unjust law because the just simply is the laws and practices of the state whose law is being discussed. Essentially, it makes justice relative to the society being discussed and thus can not be used to criticize another society (one can't say that this or that society is unjust). What one can say, however, is how well or poorly the laws, customs and practices of another society contribute to the prosperity of its citizens. This reminds me very much of Williams where in one of his final chapters he says that it would be possible to determine which ethical system is better for mankind. His idea made no sense to me at the time but in light of what Taylor is saying I think that I can make more sense of it. Moreover, thinking of justice has an important benefit: one can verify the claim that a certain set of laws is better than another for producing happy (and I mean happy in the ancient sense), thriving citizens whereas one could not verify a claim that a certain set of laws are unjust (there is nothing you could point to, other than your theory, that would confirm it). I found this very interesting.
Finally, Taylor talks about modern notions of "right", "wrong" and "obligatory". He says that such words only have a sense when set in relation to rules, laws, etc. As a result, these concepts can only be applied to actions that fall within the jurisdiction of the relevant set of laws. For the so called moral rights and wrongs, then, there must be some universal moral law which determines them. Yet showing there to be such things is exceedingly difficult and would require either a divine lawgiver, some sort of Kantian metaphysics, or etc. Whichever one of these one selects, these theories are problem laden (and I think they fail). If it is true that there are no such laws, then it is also true that there can be no moral rights and wrongs and obligations, yet this does not mean the end for ethics as these were not the things that ancient moralists were concerned with. What remains is ethics that deals with virtue and happiness and such an ethics may be very successful.
I found Taylor's analysis very interesting and good. I agree with his discussion of the ancient meanings of "good", "happiness" and "justice" and think that it is necessary to have these conceptions in mind when considering virtue ethics. Moreover, it really shows how radically different virtue ethics is as a theory when compared to the other major theories. At any rate, his discussion of moral rights and wrongs was also very interesting. I think that it is more or less correct. What he did say that I was a little unsure of was that without laws pertaining to these actions there is no murder just killing, there is no theft just taking and there is no owning just occupying. The third one seems right to me, but the first two I am unsure of. Maybe this is because I am just so acculturated with notions of moral right and wrong... What I thought was interesting though was that his view on these terms seems to imply that without the law the Williamesque "thick" concepts are eliminated. Murder is a thick concept whereas killing is not, which I thought was interesting. So far I must say that I like Taylor. I do not know if he is right, but he offers a very different way of looking at things which I think is, at the very least, worth considering.
Anyway, that is all for now. More to come shortly.
6 comments:
Aaron- On the first Taylor essay: I think there is a slippage between several senses of 'meaning' here. Taylor seems to be speaking of 'meaning' in the sense of 'importance' in the last part. But there are other senses. Examples: "The word 'snow' means that frozen H2O that falls in winter, etc." Or: "Those clouds mean it will rain tonight". Plus, I don't see why adding a purpose or goal to rock pushing gives it meaning even in ANY of these senses.
Where do you see the different senses of meaning? I did not see that in Taylor's essay, so maybe I misrepresented his ideas or just did not catch it while reading.
I think that the essential thing for Taylor is that rock pushing gets meaning as a result of the rock pusher having a purpose for the rock that is of his own creation that would come about without him. In a word, the activity is meaningful because the actor is not interchangeable. Without him there would be no final project. Without Beethoven there is no Moonlight Sonata, yet without Glen Gould there are still performances of it. That is, I think, Taylors idea: that an activity is meaningful if its product would never have come into being but for its producers imagination and work. If that does not make something, at least in some sense, important, then I am not sure what would.
What do you think could give something meaning in the importance sense?
I guess I would say that purposes must come from sentient beings. But that might well include cats or dogs too. Doesn't a bird build a nest 'in order to' have a place for her eggs? So I don't see why 'meaningful' (in the sense of 'worthwhile' or 'important' goes with 'purpose'. Even people (even Beethoven) create things purposefully that are not very 'meaningful', e.g. making a stack of old newspapers in order to carry them to the recycling bin later.
Aaron - I'm not sure why you think Taylor's 'objective' notion of happiness (where it is more like health) makes nonsense of utilitarianism. Why wouldn't it HELP? Now 'happiness' is quite objective and measurable even (which is what you seem to be saying in your note at the end of the next (justice) paragraph.)
On rules and obligations: It is true that a fix set of laws, etc. will give a clear meaning to notions like 'obligation' but it seems a bit of a jump to say that this is the only way they can get a meaning. (By the way, Anscombe discusses this issue in that Modern Moral Philosophy essay.)
I agree that birds and what not can do things on purpose, but I am not sure I see why you don't think that having a purpose plays a role here. It seems hard to imagine some activity as being meaningful or important or significant if it were done without any purpose. But, I admit that I am so sure about all this stuff. Moreover, meaning and importance in life are not necessary for making sense of virtue ethics; only having a purpose is (at least I think).
The reason Taylor's objective notion of happiness would not help the Utilitarian is because it is nonsense to talk of maximizing happiness on this conception. A person can not be more or less happy; they either are happy or they are not. Furthermore, my actions could not have the consequences of making someone else happy in the way that my actions could have the consequences of making someone feel pleasure (i.e. giving them a candy bar they wanted). This is because happiness, according to Taylor, is not just a feeling but includes one's being virtuous as well which is not something that my actions can have as a consequence for someone else. Thus, happiness viewed this way could not be what a utilitarian has in mind if he is interested in the greatest happiness for the greatest number for greatest happiness would not make sense and my actions could not be the one thing that made someone else happy.
Quickly again about the meaning business: Beethoven and others certainly do create things purposefully without there being any meaning or importance there, but that is because he and anyone else would be interchangeable with anyone else. You can separate Beethoven from paper stacking but not from Moonlight Sonata. That is, I think, Taylor's idea. I am not sure if he is right but I don't think that it is a bad thought.
p.s. The Anscombe notes are coming soon! :)
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