I have to say that I had a real hard time with this paper. At this point, I have read it three times and, though I do (I think) grasp the basics of his conclusion, I am at a loss with regards to his arguments. So then, I guess I will just shortly describe what I got from this paper, but this is something that we will certainly need to discuss on Monday.
In this paper, McDowell discusses the idea that because values are ordinarily conceived of as being in the world (or primary qualities) their reality should be denied as a result of their not actual being primary qualities. The idea is that one who conceives values as being independent of human experience is in fact mistaken. McDowell thinks that this is correct, however he believes that the way most philosophers have gone with it is incorrect. What most philosophers have thought is that because conceiving values in this way is a mistake what must really be going on is people projecting their own attitudes and feelings on to the external world. McDowell denies that this is the only interpretation of what is going on and argues for the idea that values are in fact secondary qualities (like texture or color). Thus, they are not independent of human experience yet they are not just projected attitudes either. They are, like colors, something which we can get out of the world if we have the right sort of perceptual equipment.
Sadly, this is really all I got out of this paper and even this is probably not exactly right. I just can not get at what he is trying to say here... Anyway, we can discuss this stuff on Monday.
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I think that McD is fighting against the thought that the Humean Theory of Motivation accepts, beliefs are without motivational force by themselves and so if I am to be motivated by my moral beliefs it must be because I have a desire for 'the good'. He is in part saying that this leaves out the possibility that moral beliefs are analogous to secondary qualities, they are only there because of consciousness but they really are there. The person with a virtue sees the world differently than the person without that virtue (just as someone with color vision sees things differently than someone who is color blind). This at least opens the possibility that moral beliefs directly motivate, unlike mere factual beliefs, which always need desires attached to actually get someone to act. Seeing that the building is on fire will not get you to run outside unless you have the desire not to be burned. But, McD thinks, seeing that someone is being treated unfairly might all by itself motivate action.
I am not sure whether this sort of story is supposed to apply to nasty character traits too, such as say, dishonesty. Does the dishonest person see things differently too. And is she motivated without desires in an analogous way to the honest person, just in the opposite direction?
Thanks for the clarification. I think that I more or less understand his thesis on this matter, but what I had a lot of trouble seeing was why he thought it was true. His arguments seemed obscure to me. That was where my big problem was in understanding him.
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