MacIntyre's rejection of Emotivism

MacIntyre begins his book by tackling the problem posed by emotivism, the idea that there are no moral facts and that moral statements mean nothing more than the expression of the speaker's approval or disapproval of something. He believes that this view has three major problems:

1. Emotivism does not explain what sort of approval it is that is expressed by the pro-attitudes behind moral statements. The emotivist can not say that it is moral approval because this would be circular. It is, as a result, unclear what sort of approval an agent is giving when he deems something morally praiseworthy.

2. There seems to be a difference between saying "I want you to do X." and "Duty requires you to do X." The difference seems to lie in the fact that in the first sentence the relation between the speaker and the actor matters in whether or not a reason has been given for doing X whereas in the second sentence this is not the case. Emotivists, however, have to say that the second sentence is just another way of saying the first sentence because they mean the same thing. Thus, emotivism is stuck with the problem of how to make sense of what seems to be a clear difference between these two sentences which, on the emotivist's theory, must mean the same thing.

3. The final problem with emotivism is that there is a difference between what a sentence means and what it expresses. If I say "Go away!" I may be expressing my anger, yet 'my anger' is not what the sentence means. So it may be true that moral statements express the speakers feelings but that does not mean that moral language just means those feelings.

MacIntrye believes that these three problems for emotivism shows that it is not a problem for morality but rather is only a problem for some moral systems. The one he has in mind for which emotivism is a problem is the one which it was first developed as an objection to: intuitionism. MacIntrye goes on to say that intuitionism turns out to be a moral theory that relies on one's feelings and sentiments and that, therefore, emotivism works as a response to it. However, as has been shown, emotivism does not pose a threat to all moral systems. Nevertheless, emotivism has become ingrained in our culture according to MacIntrye and is accepted not only by most philosophers but by most lay people as well.