In his book "Good and Evil", Taylor makes it clear that in his mind the most important factor about human beings, with regard to ethics, is that we are conative beings (i.e. have desires, needs, wants, goals, etc.). In other words, we have purposes and act so as to bring about certain ends; it makes sense to ask of a person why he is doing something. This is so important for Taylor because he believes that without such a fact there would be no good or evil. He imagines the world before there was life and concludes that there simply could be no good or evil there, nor could there be any in a world inhabited by beings who were not conative in their nature. Such beings would be able to percieve the world and make inferences but would never act so as to bring anything about. Worlds such as these would have no good or evil because there would be no needs or wants which could be aided or thwarted by the facts of that world. In essence, on Taylor's view good and evil exist only as the relation obtaining between the facts and a person's (or any suitably advanced being's I would imagine) desires. Good and evil are in no way woven into the fabric of the universe; they have no "higher" mystique to them in Taylor's conception.
I don't know about this. But I like the idea because such a low view of what good and evil are is usually the position inhabited by relativists and egoists, so if Taylor can pull a real deal ethical system up from such humble beginnings it would be very impressive.
Important side note: For Taylor reason is mostly just a tool of the will (which in his terminology just means the desires, wants, etc.). One desires X and then puts reason to use so as to determine the most efficient means possible for achieving his end of X. Thus, reason has little (or even nothing) to do with the end itself in Taylor's mind and is best understood as a tool.
In order to understand the nature of good and evil, Taylor entertains a thought experiment imagining that there was only one conative being on Earth. If this were so then good would consist solely in the objects of his desire and the means for achieving them and evil would consist solely in the objects of his aversion and those things that frustrate his desires. Therefore, such a world would have good and evil, yet it would not have any morally rights or wrongs. This is because there are no other people meaning that there is no standard by which such judgments can be made.
Next, Taylor imagines the addition of another conative being. The criteria for good and evil would remain the same in this case desipte the fact that these two beings may differ in their goals and aversions. Given that such a differences occur then Taylor seems to think that the goods and evils are relative to the individual. The importance of this addition however is that it creates the possibility for cooperation and for conflict. Cooperation is clearly a good as it makes possible the attainment of many other goods that could not have been attained when there was only one conative being. For example, together they can achieve more complex tasks, defend against problems more successfully, trade with one another and enjoy the pleasures of friendship. Nevertheless, conflict is also a possibility which could arise when the two beings find the same thing to be good yet only one can have it. In such a case however, the ensuing conflict could result in evils that far outweigh the good of the particular object in question. As a result, conflict would most certainly be viewed as an evil. So as to prevent these evils and encourage the goods of cooperation, certain modes of behavior will arise (Taylor calls these "rules" which threw me off at first, but then I realized that all he meant was "modes of behavior" or "ways of acting" etc., yet I feel that he should have avoided using the term "rule" simply because of the connotations that it has and the fact that it can confuse the reader a tad). An example of such a way of acting would be that whoever gets a particular good first gets to have it uncontested and so on. Over time, such modes of behavior will become increasingly more commonplace which will eventually lead to their being codified (not necessarily written) within the group. This is where morally right and wrong enter the picture as they are simply to be understood as adherence or violation of the accepted modes of behavior.
This is more or less Taylor's background for his theory. It sounds a bit contractarian, but I am not entirely sure that that is the wrong way to start. Though, I really do not know. At any rate such a start does not sound implausible. Moreover, I find it very interesting that he starts with such low conceptions of good and evil, right and wrong. To go from here to what he will later call his "ethics of aspiration" will, I think, be quite and interesting journey.
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The 'impt note' part here is in essence Hume's conception of practical reason: purely instrumental. Desires are just given and reason is used to figure out how to get what one wants. So a question: can't we also reason about what it is better or worse to want? Maybe reject some of our wants and try to cultivate others (i.e. not just accept them only reason about how to satisfy them)?
This affects his one-person case. What if that person wants stupid or trivial (or bad?) things? What if he wants to pile rocks into random sized piles all day for instance?
The two-person case sounds very like Hobbes. We all figure out that cooperation will get us much more of what we want than a 'war of all against all'. This seems true but then morality is utterly a matter of the 'rules' needed to get what the most people in a society want, no matter what that is and no matter if the next society over has very different wants. Plus, that about ol' Gyges and his ring? What seems true is that he could get even more of what he wants if he pretends to cooperate and while invisible just does whatever he wants.
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